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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
ALAN B. THOMAS, JR. (directly and ) 
derivatively in his capacity as a ) 
shareholder of LecStar Corporation) ) 
and HEATHER McFARLAND (directly ) 
and derivatively in her capacity as a ) 
shareholder of LecStar Corporation), ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN C. CANOUSE, 
STEPHEN M. HICKS, SOUTH RIDGE 
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC, 
w. DALE SMITH, CACHE CAPITAL 
(USA), L.P., ATLANTIS CAPITAL 



























CIVIL ACTION FILE 
NO. 2004CV88793 
Order on Motion for Summary Judgment 
On December 4, 2008, Counsel appeared before this Court to present oral 
argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Directors W. Dale 
Smith and John C. Canouse as well as Southridge Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, or, in the alternative, Partial Summary Judgment.1 After reviewing the 
1 Defendants Stephen M. Hicks, South ridge Capital Management LLC, and McCormack Avenue Ltd. 
(collectively, the "Southridge Defendants" filed their motion for summary judgment on August 29,2003. 
arguments made by counsel, the record of the case, and the briefs submitted on the 
motions, the Court finds as follows: 
This case involves alleged securities fraud. The Plaintiffs are three (3) 
shareholders of the LecStar Corporation, a Texas corporation. LecStar was a publically 
traded company, organized in 1998, that operated as a Competitive Local Exchange 
("CLEC") in the deregulated telecom environment. LecStar operated in eight states in 
the Southeast. LecStar Corporation is now dissolved. 
LecStar Corporation had one subidiary, LecStar COr}lmunications Corporation, a 
Delaware corporation, which wholly owned two additional subsidiaries LecStar Telecom 
("Telecom") and LecStar DataNet ("DataNet"), both Georgia corporations (collectively 
together with LecStar Corp. and LecStar Communications Corp. "LecStar"). Plaintiffs 
filed this action individually and derivatively on behalf of LecStar in 2004 against three 
(3) former LecStar managers, who allegedly fraudulently transferred all of LecStar's 
assets to Defendant McCormack Avenue Ltd., a British Virgin Islands corporation 
("McCormack") for their own benefit. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Cache 
Capital (USA), LP ("Cache"), owned in part by Defendant John Canouse and his brother 
Joseph Canouse, along with Defendants Southridge Capital Management LLC 
("Southridge") and Atlantis Capital Fund. Ltd. ("Atlantis"), both entities controlled by 
Defendant Hicks, allegedly participated in the conspiracy to fraudulently transfer all of 
LecStar's assets to McCormack. 
In April and May of 2002, LecStar entered into eight secured loans with 
Southridge and other institutional investors such as Maple Circle (an entity formed and 
controlled by Defendant Hicks), as well as with individual LecStar officers including Dale 
2 
Smith, President, William Woulfin, CEO, Jim Malcom, CFO, and Donald Santavicca, 
Controller. For each loan, LecStar entered into a promissory note with the lender. 
Some of those notes, such as the second Maple Circle note,2 granted the holder a "first 
priority security interest in all of the assets" of LecStar including the stock of DataNet 
and Telecom. Plaintiffs contend that other notes, such as the Woulfin and Malcom 
notes, did not originally provide the holder with such security, although those notes were 
later amended to grant a first priority interest on all assets including the stock of 
DataNet and Telecom.3 The total amount due on the notes was $769,000. Each note 
was required to be paid either at a maturity date prior to December, 2002, or upon 
demand. 
In October, 2002, James Grenfell, former CEO of LecStar, obtained an arbitration 
award against LecStar for over $1 million. The award was affirmed by Cobb County 
Superior Court on November 4, 2002. 
Around November 25, 2002, all eight promissory notes, and their attendant 
rights, were assigned to McCormack. At this time the law firm of Blank Rome Tenzer 
Greenblatt, LLP ("Blank Rome"), which had previously represented LecStar and which 
continued to remain in close contact with Defendant Hicks, began representing 
2 Maple Circle entered into 3 promissory notes with LecStar: the first in the amount of $175,000.00 in 
July, 2002, the second in the amount of $175,000.00 in August, 2002, and the third in the amount of 
$90,000.00 in September, 2002. 
3 Plaintiffs assert that the original terms of the promissory notes with the William Woulfin, Jim Malcom, 
Southshore Capital Fund Ltd.,a British Virgin Islands corporation created by Hicks, and the first Maple 
Circle Ltd., another British Virgin Islands corporation created by Hicks, were either unsecured or 
contained a security interest that excluded Telecom and DataNet. Copies of the promissory notes are 
included in the record at Plaintiffs' Exhibits 24 and 27. Those notes, however, all list the security interest 
as a "first priority security interst in all the assets of the Payor (the "Collateral") to secure the payment of 
this Note .... " Citing William Woulfin's Affidavit, Plaintiffs allege that the security interest was later 
expanded to include all assets between August 30,2002 and November 14, 2002. Plaintiffs Exhibit 50. 
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McCormack in the "asset acquisition" of LecStar.4 On December 2, 2002, McCormack, 
through Blank Rome, made demand upon LecStar for immediate payment of all 
principal and interest due on the notes.5 McCormack offered to accept all of the 
LecStar assets, including the stock of DataNet and Telecom (the collateral) for the notes 
in full satisfaction of the debt. 
At the time of the McCormack demand, the LecStar Board of Directors was 
comprised of Messrs. Smith, Canouse, and Woulfin.6 Because Directors Smith and 
Woulfin issued notes to LecStar, which they assigned to McCormack, they resigned 
their directorships and did not participate in decision to accept or reject McCormack's 
offer. Director John Canouse (a Defendant in this action), acting as the sole director of 
LecStar, accepted McCormack's offer and voluntarily surrendered to McCormack all of 
LecStar's assets including the stock of Telecom and DataNet. At this time, LecStar's 
stock was trading at 1 ¢. The following day, on December 6, 2002, LecStar Corp. and 
LecStar Communications Corp. entered into an Acceptance of Collateral Agreement 
with McCormack ("Acceptance Agreement") whereby the physical assets and the stock 
in DataNet and Telecom were transferred to McCormack. After the McCormack 
transaction there was no change in the telecommunications services provided through 
DataNet and Telecom, the operating divisions of LecStar. 
In September 2003, McCormack transferred the former LecStar assets to LTEL 
Holding Corporation ("L TEL") in a stock exchange for approximately $28 million. L TEL 
is a Delaware company formed by Defendant Hicks on November 21, 2002? At the 
4 See, §:..9.:., Plaintiffs' Exhibits 22 and 30. 
5 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 77. 
6 See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 37. 
7 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4 
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time of the transfer, Defendant Smith was the President and sole director of L TEL. 
Defendants Smith and Hicks, along with William Woulfson, all former LecStar officers, 
were re-elected as officers of L TEL and received stock in L TEL as a result of their 
"continued service" to the company and/or by signing a release of debt against L TEL. 8 
Additional L TEL shareholders include McCormack, Cache, and Canouse, as well as Jim 
Malcom, and Donald Santavicca, who together with Defendants Smith and Hicks and 
William Woulfson comprised the majority of L TEL shareholders. 
In the fall of 2003, L TEL and Fonix entered into a merger agreement which 
closed in April, 2004. Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, Fonix acquired 
L TEL, which continued as a Fonix subsidiary, for $33 million dollars. Fonix filed for 
bankruptcy in October 2006. 
The heart of the debate in this case revolves around LecStar's valuation at the 
time of the McCormack transaction. Plaintiffs challenge the decision of the LecStar 
Board of Directors (i.e., Defendant Canouse) to relinquish all LecStar assets to satisfy a 
debt of approximately $769,000. Plaintiffs allege that the transfer was a part of a 
fraudulent scheme to avoid the company's obligation to Grenfell and to eliminate the 
rights of certain minority shareholders. Defendants, on the other hand, assert that the 
McCormack transaction was fair and reasonable. Defendants assert that at the time of 
the sale, LecStar was operating at a deficit of approximately $200,000 per month and 
that the forced liquidation sale of the assets drastically drove down the value of the 
assets. 
Determining the valuation of LecStar at the time of the McCormack transaction is 
difficult due to the conflicting valuation reports of the parties and contemporaneous 
8 See e.g., Plaintiffs' Exhibits 2 and 109. 
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statements made by Defendants. LecStar was an operating CLEC in the Southeast that 
had over 24,000 customers and a significant infrastructure developed. In the months 
immediately leading up to the McCormack transaction, Defendant Hicks issued press 
releases praising the company's customer and revenue growth as well as its debt 
consolidation. In addition, contemporaneous Securities and Exchange Commission 
("SEC") filings reflected historical operating losses as well as current cash flow 
problems, but also documented a growing customer base, revenue stream, and debt 
consolidation. 
Adding to the conflicting views of valuation are the different LecStar valuations 
generated around the time of the McCormack transaction. One estimate provided by 
Southeast Associates9 valued the assets between $82,516 and $264,825. Another 
report prepared by a Southridge employee valued LecStar at $26.3 million. In addition, 
Mr. Francom, Plaintiffs' expert, valued the LecStar assets worth between $18 and $25.5 
million on December 5, 2002. Within thirty days of the McCormack transaction, another 
third party appraiser, Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., Inc., estimated LecStar's assets to be 
worth between $8.27 and $10.57 million. Additionally, McCormack reported the value of 
its asset/stock exchange with L TEL as worth approximately $27 million in February 
2003, only a few months after the McCormack transaction. Finally, the L TELlFonix 
transaction closed in 2004 for a total of $33 million. The table below outlines the 
different valuations, as well as their sources and dates. 
9 In October, 2002, LecStar retained and paid Southeast Associates a retainer to conduct an appraisal of 
the business. That retainer was eventually returned to LecStar and the valuation was ultimately paid for 
by Maple Circle, a creditor of LecStar, before the notes were assigned to McCormack. The record also 
contains various email correspondences between Defendant Hicks and Southeast Associates regarding 
the valuation of LecStar. 
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Date Source LecStar Valuation 
December 10, Southeast Associates Fair Market $264,825 FMV 
2002 Valuation of Orderly Liquidation Value $82,516 forced liquidation 
value 
Dec. 20021 LecStar Model Southridge employee $26.3 million 
January 2003 valuation of LecStar 
December 5, 2008 Mr. Francom, Plaintiffs' expert $ 18-25.5 million 
(performed 2007) 
December 30, Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., Inc. $8.27-10.57 million 
2002 valuation 
September 5,2003 McCormack report to the SEC when it $20 million + $7.5 million 
(Date Sale Closed) transferred LecStar assets to L TEL option 
[Merger signed 
February 2003] 
February, 2004 Stock transfer of L TEL to Fonix $33 million 
(Date Merger 
Closed) 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The Southridge Defendants, joined by Defendants Canouse and Smith, assert 
that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff McFarland's claims because the transfer of 
assets occurred in 2002, but Plaintiff McFarland did not join the action until April 2007. 
Citing the applicable four year statute of limitations, V.T.C.A. § 16.004, Defendants 
assert that Plaintiff McFarland's claims are time barred and not subject to relation back 
to the original pleadings. See Crowley v. Coles, 760 S.W.23d 347. 
Plaintiffs argue, however, that Georgia law controls this issue because relation 
back is a procedural matter. See Griffen v. Hunt Refining Co., 292 Ga. App. 451 
(2008). Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c), relation back is allowed whenever there is 
an identity of interests between the old and new parties so that it will not create 
prejudice to the opposing party. If leave is sought to change or add plaintiffs after the 
expiration of the statute of limitation, provided "the claim ... asserted in the amended 
[complaint] arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted 
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to be set forth in the original [complaint], the amendment relates back to the date of the 
original [complaint]." Morris v. Chewning, 201 Ga. App. 658, 659, (1991) (citing OCGA § 
9-11-15(c)). Plaintiffs assert that both Ms. McFarland and Mr. Thomas are shareholders 
and therefore share a unity of interests. Additionally, the claims brought by Ms. 
McFarland in Sixth Amended Complaint arise out of same conduct and same 
transaction (the McCormack transaction) complained of in the original Complaint. 
The Court finds that Georgia law prevails on the issue of relation back. The 
Court also finds that Plaintiff McFarland shares a unity of interest with Plaintiff Thomas 
and alleges claims arising out of the same transaction so that Defendants are not 
prejudiced by Plaintiff McFarland's claim. Thus, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the statute of limitation claim as to Plaintiff 
McFarland. 
STANDING 
Defendants Smith and Canouse contend that Plaintiffs Thomas and McFarland 
lack standing to assert direct claims against them for breach of fiduciary duty because 
the claims are derivative in nature and must be pled as such. Whether a claim is direct 
or derivative in nature is determined by the law of the state of incorporation. Karmen v. 
Kemper Fin. Servs. Inc., 500 U.S. 90,108-109 (1991). 
The Texas code allowing the distinction between a direct and derivative action to 
be relaxed in the context of a shareholder derivative suit in a closely held corporation is 
inapplicable in this case because LecStar does not qualify under that statute. V.A.T.S. 
Bus.Corp.Act, Art. 5.14(L). Aside from the statutorily provided exception, Texas case 
law does not recognize a general relaxation of the direct/derivative distinction. Redmon 
8 
v. Griffith, 202 S.W.3d 225, 236 (Tex. App. 2006) ("The fiduciary duty an officer or 
director owes to the corporation is distinguishable from a fiduciary relationship that may 
exist between majority and minority shareholders or otherwise by contract or other 
special relationship between the individual parties."); ct. Haggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d 
472,487 n.13 (Tex. App. 1997) (recognizing "limited circumstances" where a majority 
shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder); Norman v. Nash 
Johnson & Sons' Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248,255 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing 
North Carolina and other states' recognition of a minority shareholder's right to bring a 
direct action against a wrongdoing or oppressive majority shareholder). Because 
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a unique or special injury or the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship separate from that created by Defendants' roles as directors of LecStar, the 
Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' direct 
claims of fiduciary duty for lack of standing. 
Defendants Smith and Canouse also contend that Plaintiffs Thomas and 
McFarland fail the standing requirements for derivative suits articulated in Article 5.14 of 
the Texas Business Corporations Act, because they (a) fail to "adequately represent the 
interests of the corporation," and (b) Plaintiff McFarland failed to make a separate 
demand upon the corporation. 
Whether a plaintiff shareholder adequately represents the interests of the 
corporation is a decision for the trial court, which shall not be disturbed absent abuse of 
discretion. Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., 651 F.2d 1030, 1040 (5th Cir. 
1981). A plaintiff in a shareholder derivative action owes the corporation his undivided 
loyalty. The plaintiff must not have ulterior motives and must not be pursuing an external 
9 
personal agenda. In deciding this question, the court may properly consider Plaintiffs' 
stake in the corporation as balanced against their interests and how the litigation may 
affect their external interests. Smith v. Ayres, 977 F.2d 946, 949 (5th Cir. 1992). "The 
trial court may properly consider the plaintiff's vindictiveness toward the defendant in 
determining whether the plaintiff is an adequate representative of the stockholders." lQ. 
In Smith, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's conclusion that 
the shareholder plaintiff was not an adequate representative where that plaintiff's 
company share was 1/10,000,000 of the authorized shares and where the plaintiff had a 
history of lawsuits and personal animosity against the director defendants. 
In this case, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have a personal agenda contrary to 
the interests of the corporation because (1) they are former executives or are related to 
former executives who were fired in 2001; and (2) they are advancing the interests of 
Mr. Grenfell, LecStar's former CEO and judgment creditor of LecStar. Additionally, 
Defendants contend that because Defendants held the majority of interests in LecStar 
Plaintiffs should not to be found to adequately represent the interests of the corporation. 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs hold a sufficient ownership interest in LecStar in 
order to bring this action. Additionally, Plaintiffs have fully disclosed their relationship 
with Mr. Grenfell and the terms of the stipulation agreement entered into with him. The 
Court finds that Plaintiffs' relationship with Mr. Grenfell does not demonstrate 
"vindictiveness" towards either Defendants or the corporation sufficient to strip them of 
their rights to bring a derivative action. 
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With respect to Plaintiff McFarland's demand requirement, the Court finds that 
Plaintiff McFarland may join in the original demand brought by Plaintiff Thomas.1o 
Previous demands and the subsequent decision by the board of directors should "bind 
similarly situated shareholders making identical claims. Judicial economy demands that 
identical claims, which in actuality belong to the corporation, be simultaneously 
disposed of by one demand." Pace v. Jordan, 999 S.W.2d 615, 621 (Tex. App.1999); 
see also Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. Art. 5.14 (demand is required "unless the shareholder 
has earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected by the corporation .... "). 
Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a derivative action. 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Director Defendants seek summary judgment on the grounds that their actions 
are protected by the business judgment rule. Under Texas law, the business judgment 
rule is "a rule of substantive law under which a corporate director is entitled to a 
presumption of validity and good faith that cannot be overcome unless the plaintiff 
pleads and proves (1) that the directors' conduct was either ultra vires or fraudulent, or 
(2) that the directors had a personal interest in the transactions complained of." F.D.I.C. 
v. Schreiner, 892 F.Supp. 869, 880 -881 (W.D.Tex. 1995). In addition, a director's 
action that is grossly negligent may not be protected by the business judgment rule in 
Texas. TTT Hope, Inc. v. Hill, 2008 WL 4155465, *9 (S.D.Tex. 2008): see also, 
F.D.I.C. v. Benson, 867 F.Supp. 512, 523 (S.D.Tex. 1994) (concluding that Texas 
10 Plaintiff McFarland asserts that she made an independent demand upon LecStar on April 20, 2004. 
That demand is not in the record and is contested by Defendants. 
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business-judgment rule will protect a director as long as his acts are not grossly 
negligent or a complete abdication of duty). 
Defendants assert that the McCormack transaction was approved by Defendant 
Canouse who, at the time, was not a creditor of LecStar, a shareholder/officer in 
McCormack, or a shareholder/officer in L TEL 11 and therefore was uninterested. 
Defendants argue that a transaction approved by uninterested directors, regardless of 
other potential conflicts, is protected by the business judgment rule. Roth v. Mims, 298 
8.R. 272, 288 (N.D.Tex. 2003) ("An interested transaction may nevertheless be valid if 
(1) the material facts of the relationship or interest are disclosed and the transaction is 
approved by a majority of the disinterested directors ... ). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant 
Canouse wa~ "interested" in the transaction, breached his duty of loyalty to the 
corporation, engaged in fraudulent conduct, acted with gross negligence, and was not 
provided with all material information regarding the McCormack transaction. 
Officers and directors owe a duty of loyalty to their corporation to act only in the 
corporation's and its shareholders' best interest. In re Performance Nutrition, Inc., 239 
B.R. 93, 110 (N.D.Tex. 1999). To fulfill the duty of loyalty, a director must exercise an 
"extreme measure of candor, unselfishness and good faith," particularly where there is 
an interested transaction. International Bankers Life Insurance Co. v. Holloway, 368 
S.W.2d 567, 577 (Tex. 1963). Whether an officer or director is "interested" is a question 
of fact and encompasses transactions where the director derives a personal profit or 
which deprive the corporation of an opportunity to profit. Id. 
11 Defendant Canouse later obtained shares in McCormack and again in L TEL as a result of the 
McCormackiL TEL transaction. In addition, Cache, along with Atlantis and Sherman-entities in which 
both Defendant Canouse and his brother Joseph Canouse held interests and/or influence (advisors)-
held shares in LecStar and later obtained shares in McCormack and L TEL. 
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Defendant Canouse testified in his deposition that at the time of the McCormack 
transaction he did not have an interest in McCormack nor did he expect to have an 
interest in the assets transferred. That testimony notwithstanding, within one year of the 
McCormack transaction, the LecStar assets were transferred from McCormack to L TEL 
where Defendant Canouse was made a director and a shareholder without providing 
consideration other than his "continued service" .12 Both McCormack and L TEL were 
created within the months preceding the McCormack transaction, and were both 
controlled by Hicks as an officer and director and through his affiliated entities (i.e., 
Southridge) as majority shareholders. In addition, Defendant Hicks sent emails in 
December 2002 discussing a future transfer of assets from McCormack to L TEL. 
Plaintiffs also allege that Hicks and Canouse had a long-standing and close personal 
and business relationship. 
The McCormack transaction was a coordinated effort among LecStar's creditors-
-Hicks, Hicks-controlled entities (Southshore, Maple Circle) and LecStar officers and 
directors (Smith, Hicks, Woulfin, Malcom, Santi vacca). LecStar executed secured notes 
to these creditors, who then transferred all of the notes to McCormack, an off-shore 
entity recently created by Hicks. McCormack then made a demand upon LecStar, 
which was approved by Canouse as the sole remaining director. Before the 
McCormack transaction was approved, LecStar was represented by Blank Rome, who, 
after a series of communications with Defendant Hicks and other LecStar officers and 
directors, began representing McCormack. In fact, Blank Rome served McCormack's 
demand letter on LecStar, its former client. These communications between Blank 
Rome, Defendant Hicks, and other LecStar officers and directors raise serious 
12 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2. 
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questions regarding the McCormack transaction, especially in light of the fact that 
neither Blank Rome's alternating allegiance and communications with the LecStar 
officers and directors were not disclosed to the LecStar Board of Directors (Le., 
Defendant Canouse) at the December 5,2002 board meeting. 
Defendants refer the Court to Board of Directors' due diligence actions in 
reviewing the McCormack transaction citing to financial reports prepared by the CFO, a 
report from bankruptcy counsel Arnall Golden & Gregory,13 previous restructuring 
efforts, cost-cutting measures, and the independent appraisal report prepared by 
Southeast Appraisal Resource Association. Defendants highlight that pursuant to 
Texas law, a director may rely in good faith and with ordinary care on the opinion, 
reports, and information prepared by officers and employees of the corporation as well 
as professionals hired by the corporation such as attorneys and accountants. Tex. Bus. 
Corp. Act. Ann. Art. 2.41 D. 
LecStar CFO James Malcom, creditor of LecStar and future shareholder/director 
in L TEL, reported to the Board on December 5, 2003, that additional funding was 
necessary to continue the company and that he has substantial doubt regarding the 
company's future as a going concern. Mr. Malcom also reported to the LecStar Board 
that the company had exhausted all other remedies because it had restructured its 
liabilities and capital to attract investors, which failed, and had cut corporate overhead 
as much as possible but was unable to meet its cash needs. Malcom's financial interest 
as a creditor of LecStar (known by the Board) and his future interest in L TEL as a 
13 The LecStar Board of Directors received a report from bankruptcy counsel, Arnall, Golden and Gregory 
that bankruptcy was not a viable option. In addition, during the December 5, 2002 Board meeting, the 
Board concluded that LecStar had $20,000 in capital to cover $200,000 in ongoing operational costs. 
See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 37. 
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shareholder and director call into question whether or not a director could rely in good 
faith upon his report. Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that Malcom had knowledge of the 
Southridge report valuing LecStar at $26 million, but did not disclose that report to the 
Board of Directors. 
In addition, Plaintiffs challenge the independence of the LecStar valuation 
prepared by Southeast. LecStar paid Southeast a retainer to conduct the valuation, but 
that money was ultimately returned to LecStar when Maple Circle, a creditor of LecStar 
and entity controlled by Defendant Hicks, funded the valuation report. In addition, the 
record contains several emails from Defendant Hicks communicating with Southeast 
regarding their valuation report to provide it with information or to comment on valuation 
estimates or techniques. 14 This information regarding the Southeast valuation was not 
disclosed to the LecStar Board of Directors prior to voting on the McCormack 
transaction. Finally, the Southeast valuation report was not finalized until December 10, 
2002, five days after the Board of Directors' meeting. 
Defendants also argue that there was no alternative to the McCormack 
transaction because the notes issued were valid and due. Because an officer or 
director has a contractual right to take a certain action, does not establish as a matter of 
law that he/she did not breach a fiduciary duty in exercising that right. Spethmann v. 
Anderson, 171 S.W. 3d 680, 696 (Tex. App. 2005). In Spethmann, director defendants 
entered into a buy sell agreement with the corporation. The company repurchased 
shares after two director/shareholders resigned over conflict. In buying back the stock, 
it depleted the company of over 80% of its assets. The Court held as a matter of law 
14 See. e.g., Plaintiffs' Exhibit 66 (November, 2002, email from Defendant Hicks to Southeast reviewing 
the LecStar Appraisal and suggesting changes, including the insertion of McCormack Avenue into the 
report); see also Plaintiffs' Exhibit 57. 
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that complying with the buy-sell agreement did not make the transaction fair to the 
corporation as a matter of law, and thus upheld a jury verdict for breach of fiduciary 
duty. Id. As in Spethmann, the Court in this action must determine whether the 
McCormack transaction was not only authorized by contractual rights, but was 
undertaken in compliance with fiduciary duties owed to the corporation. 
Defendants argue that there is no evidence of Canouse's interest in the 
transaction, fraud, or negligence. The Court disagrees and finds that Plaintiffs have 
raised questions of fact regarding whether material information about the relationship 
and interest of the other directors was disclosed prior to Canouse's approval of the 
McCormack transaction. Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have raised 
questions of fact regarding whether or not Defendant Canouse was interested in the 
McCormack transaction and/or acted in good faith in approving it. See Gearhart Indus.! 
Inc. v. Smith Int'I, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719-720 (5th Cir. 1984); Int'I Bankers Life Ins. Co. 
v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 577 (Tex. 1963); General Dynamics v. Torres, 915 
S.W.2d 45 (Tex. App. 1995). Ultimately, Canouse personally profited from the 
transaction which deprived LecStar and its remaining shareholders of the assets. That 
the directors inserted a shell entity (McCormack) to hold the assets in between the 
transfer from LecStar to L TEL does not necessarily insulate those directors from breach 
of fiduciary duty suits; otherwise, fiduciary duties of loyalty could be abrogated by simply 
inserting a middle man. 
Finally, Plaintiffs raise questions of fact regarding whether or not Defendant 
Canouse participated in a "fraudulent" scheme. Defendants assert that Plaintiff's 
inability to demonstrate that Canouse knew about the scheme at the time of the transfer 
16 
merits summary judgment in their favor. Knowledge, however, is usually determined by 
circumstantial evidence, which has been sufficiently entered into the record here to 
raise irresolvable questions of fact (e.g., the transfer of the notes, the timing of 
McCormack/L TEL creation, the grant of stock in LTEL, the overlapping web of control 
by Hicks/Canouse/Joseph Canouse over the entities involved). Taylor Elec. Services, 
Inc. v. Armstrong Elec. Supply Co., 167 S.W.3d 522, 528 (Tex. App. 2005). The Court, 
however, agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have failed to rebut the business 
judgment rule on the grounds that Canouse acted with gross negligence. 
A transaction that is not protected by the business judgment rule, may still be upheld 
if the transaction was fair as a matter of law. Roth v. Mims, 298 B.R. 272, 288 (N.D. 
Tex. 2003). To satisfy the entire fairness test, Texas courts review the "full adequacy of 
the consideration." Crook v. Williams Drug Co., Inc., 558 S.W.2d 500, 506 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1977). Defendants contend that the Southeast appraisal of LecStar is evidence of 
a fair price, therefore satisfying the entire fairness test. For the reasons addressed 
above, the Court will not rely solely on the Southeast appraisal. In addition, alternative 
valuations provided by Southridge, Ladenburg, Francom, and the subsequent L TEL and 
FONIX transactions valued the assets substantially higher than in the report prepared 
by Southeast. Therefore, the Court rejects Defendants' argument that they are entitled 
to summary judgment under the entire fairness test even if the business judgment rule 
does not apply to the McCormack transaction. 
Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims. 
17 
AIDING AND ABETTING A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs fail to establish all elements of "aiding and 
abetting" as provided in Insight technology Inc., v. FreightCheck, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 19, 
25 (2006), because no fiduciary duties were breached and no actions were taken by the 
Southridge Defendants. In light of the Court's ruling on fiduciary duty claims above, 
Defendants' first argument fails. Citing to the Woulfin Affidavit, Plaintiffs assert that the 
Southridge Defendants participated in this scheme by "repapering" the notes that were 
transferred, in part by the Southridge Defendants, to McCormack which lead to the 
foreclosure. Plaintiffs assert that the original notes to Wolfson and Malcom were not 
secured and that the original Southshore and Maple Circle notes had a limited collateral 
description excluding the stock of Telecom and DataNet.15 Finally, Plaintiffs point out 
that Hicks formed L TEL in November, 2002 as part of the alleged scheme to transfer 
the assets back onshore after they were foreclosed upon by McCormack. The record 
also contains email correspondences between the secured creditors and the Blank 
Rome attorney, with Hicks copied, discussing the plan for a subsequent transfer of the 
assets.16 
The Court hereby finds that questions of fact remain regarding whether or not the 
Southridge Defendants acted to procure a breach of fiduciary duty; therefore, the Court 
15 Plaintiffs Exhibits 24-27 address the eight promissory notes. Those exhibits, however do not contain 
promissory notes with a restricted collateral description. Instead, the provided promissory notes 
specifically state that the creditor is given a first priority security interest in all assets. Plaintiffs point to 
Woulfin's Affidavit, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 50, as proof that the notes were repapered where he states that he 
participated, along with Defendant Smith, in repapering the notes. Additionally, Plaintiffs highlight Exhibits 
25 and 26, the UCC financing statements filed by Maple Circle in August, 2002, which lists its security 
interest in LecStar's assets as accounts receivable, proceeds from loans, proceeds from the issuance of 
debt or equity, and proceeds from any legal settlement or judgment. 
16 See e.g., Plaintiffs Exhibits 31, 43, and 93. 
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hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Aiding and Abetting 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty claims. 
CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
Plaintiffs have demonstrated triable issues of fact that Defendants may have 
participated in a civil conspiracy to commit torts. Insight Technology, Inc. v. 
FreightCheck, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 19 (2006) ("Turning to the issue of whether Insight 
has identified specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue, we conclude that Insight 
adduced evidence from which a jury could infer that Hull, acting as an agent of both 
GetLoaded and FreightCheck, tortuously procured Brewer's breach of his fiduciary duty, 
damaging Insight".); Strange v. Housing Authority of Summmerville, 268 Ga. App. 403, 
410 (2004). The Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiffs' claims of civil conspiracy. 
GEORGIA UNIFORM FRADULENT TRANSFERS ACT ("GUFTA") 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated O.C.G.A. §§ 18-2-74(a)(1) and 18-2-
75(a) with the McCormack transaction. GUFTA protects valid creditors from sham 
asset transfers by debtors for the purposes of hiding assets from that creditor. Plaintiffs 
assert the GUFTA claims both directly and derivatively. 
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 18-2-71(4) a creditor is "a person who has a claim." A 
claim is defined as "a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, 
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, 
legal, equitable, secured or unsecured." lQ.. (3). Because this Court has already 
granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs direct claims, Plaintiffs cannot 
qualify as creditors under GUFTA to bring direct claims. 
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On their derivative claims, Plaintiffs contend that when the LecStar Board of 
Directors approved the McCormack transaction on December 5,2002, Plaintiffs became 
creditors of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In this scenario, LecStar is the debtor 
and Defendants are beneficial transferees. See Qwest Comm'ns Corp. v. Weisz, 278 F. 
Supp. 2d 1188, 1191 (S.D. Cal. 2003) ("[J]udgment may be had against transferees or 
"the person for whose benefit the transfer was made."). This argument, however, 
ignores that derivative actions bring claims belonging to the corporation, but raised by 
the shareholders. This distinction is more than intellectual, and is evidenced by the 
requirement that any recovery in a derivative suit inures to the corporation, not to the 
shareholders individually. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,538-539 (1970) ("The 
proceeds of the [shareholder derivative suit] belong to the corporation and it is bound by 
the result of the suit.") Thus, in this scenario, Plaintiffs seek to bring a claim on behalf of 
LecStar as the creditor against LecStar as the debtor. While GUFTA is written with 
broad language to provide a flexible statute to facilitate the recovery of fraudulent 
transfers, the language of the statute cannot be stretched so that Plaintiffs can bring a 
suit alleging that LecStar is both the creditor and debtor in a single transaction. The 
Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' 
GUFTA claims. 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
The Southridge Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim of unjust 
enrichment arguing that none of the LecStar assets were transferred to Mr. Hicks or 
Southridge. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, assert that the Defendants were enriched 
because they received stock in L TEL (because of past service and release of claims) 
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and subsequently in Fonix as a term of the merger with L TEL. "Where one unjustly 
obtains a pecuniary advantage of another to which he is not legally entitled and refuses 
to make restitution, an action for unjust enrichment lies .... it is not essential that the 
defendant come into possession of money or property, but simply that he be unjustly 
enriched by obtaining some financial advantage of the plaintiff." Trust Co. of Ga. v. S. & 
W. Cafeteria, 97 Ga. App. 268, 284 (1958). 
The Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims because questions of fact remain. 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEEDS 
Defendants seek summary judgment on the alternative grounds that LecStar was 
insolvent at the time of the McCormack transaction so there were no damages, and that 
even if damages were recovered, eighty percent of any recovery would be distributed to 
Defendants as the majority shareholders. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act. Art. 6.04. The Court 
finds these questions of damages premature in light of the outstanding questions of 
liability and DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on these grounds. 
SO ORDERED this liR day of JO\Y1~ ,2009. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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